The geo-political dynamics of China"s increased presence in Latin America pose unique strategic challenges and opportunities for the United States. Bilateral relationships that have traditionally been strong between the United States and Latin America could potentially erode in the near future if the United States fails to adequately maintain its ties with its partners in the region. Some experts argue that China fully understands the sensitivities surrounding its deepening ties with Latin America and that the United States should not interpret China"s growing interest in the region as a threat or challenge. 1 China, however, is undeniably a rising global competitor for the United States. If the United States fails to maintain strong political, economic, and military ties in the region, it could possibly see itself dealing with China as a potential adversary leveraging its own influence in the region. China is already courting favor with countries in Latin America that share strong mutual economic interests as well as maintaining close relations with those countries in the hemisphere that have strong anti-U.S. sentiments.
Failure of the United States to recognize and mitigate this challenge in the near term could have significant effects for the nation in the next ten to fifteen years.
While the United States continues to wrestle with its strategic policy dilemmas in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and India, it faces another equally challenging and potentially more problematic dilemma in how to deal with a rapidly emerging China in its proverbial "backyard". There is a considerable ongoing debate among Washington policy makers whether a "rising China" is a benign global competitor or a subtly rising adversary in the Western Hemisphere. Some China scholars assert that the American policy-making establishment has adopted a "Strong China Paradigm"-namely, that China will continue developing economically while maintaining political stability and that it will increasingly use its strength to exert power abroad. 2 This paradigm is largely based on the fact that the PRC"s pursuit of long term strategic interests is leading that country to increase its presence in Latin America with potentially serious future national security implications for the United States.
This monograph examines how China"s unique employment of its elements of national power using the DIME paradigm is forging new relationships with countries throughout Latin America. Latin America is not a monolithic region and individual countries have special and unique relationships with China; however, for this particular study, the discussion of Latin America as a region will be used as a model for examining
China"s overarching strategy from a broad geographical context. Ultimately, understanding the nature and dynamics of China"s employment of the DIME principles of national power casts light on the strategic challenges the United States will face as its partner nations to the South create new alliances with America"s most rapidly growing peer competitor.
Chinese Diplomacy in Latin America and the Art of Soft Power
Diplomacy is the first element of the DIME model and it is the key that drives Sino-Latin American relations. It is the bedrock of China"s relation building. To date, the PRC has steadily increased its efforts on the political and diplomatic fronts in the region as part of its regional grand strategy. China has become much more sophisticated and influential in building alliances and strengthening its relationships in the region. To its credit, China is effectively building its capacity in the region and, through carefully crafted diplomacy; it is shaping the strategic environment in Latin America. What remains yet unseen is how China will use its growing influence in a region where the interests of two of world"s competing giants increasingly overlap.
Getting the Message Right -Information Management and Strategic Communication
In examining the second element of the DIME paradigm -Information -it is interesting the way China has successfully marketed its interests in Latin America. It has done so through a carefully crafted information campaign by assuring its global neighbors that its peaceful rise as a global power is benign and non-threatening.
Beijing has skillfully crafted a message to reassure the United States, as well as to the rest of the world, of China"s intentions in the region. Beijing"s challenge is to arrest alarm and alleviate concern of the potential long term impact of its expansion in the region and portray this phenomenon as a natural outcome of its "peaceful rise". China claims its interests in Latin America are not driven by ideological factors nor is it intended to disrupt the relationships the United States has in the region. 13 The central message of the PRC"s public diplomacy campaign is that its peaceful rise caries the intent to build a more harmonious world. This is a message that is directly promulgated by Premiere Hu Jintao and is reiterated through the party"s ideological apparatus.
14 China has undertaken the precarious task of balancing its growing presence and influence in Latin America without raising significant concern from Washington"s policy makers. In this sense, China has done an exceptional job of its strategic messaging. It has skillfully exercised discretion and self-restraint with regard to Sino-Latin American relations and has carefully conducted its business with different counties in the region with remarkable informational efficiency.
In the [2005] hearing before the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, administration officials appeared to downplay concerns about China"s engagement with Latin American nations, although they voiced some concerns regarding potential future Chinese regional capabilities in the fields of intelligence, communications, and cyber warfare. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega testified that "China"s influence in the region is minimal today," and that while China"s presence in the hemisphere is growing, "it is safe to say the United States has been and will continue to be the longterm partner of preference." Nevertheless, Noriega maintained that the United States would continue to monitor China"s outreach to Latin America, just as it monitors China"s outreach around the world. China is also listening to what the world has to say about it and it is embracing the discussion. Official statements from the PRC indicate that it is carefully monitoring how the world views China. It is acutely attuned to anti-Chinese sentiment and international public opinion about how its actions are perceived. Beijing regularly uses public opinion polls to monitor its relationships; however, its primary mechanisms for garnering feedback are its growing network of embassies and consulates across the globe. It has made a substantial investment in building and preparing its diplomatic corps, training thousands of its best students to serve overseas to study their target state and society first hand. 18 China has made it clear that it intends to build its informational capacity overseas. The Chinese minister of propaganda, Liu Yushan, published the following statement in an essay in 2009:
It has become an urgent strategic task for us [China] to make our communication capability match our international status. In this modern era, who gains the advanced communication skills, the powerful communication capability and whose culture and value is more widely spread is able to more effectively influence the world.
19
China remains consistent and calculated in its information policy and messaging regarding its interests in Latin America. As part of that policy, it will remain careful not to antagonize the United States by maintaining that its interest in the region are benign and are primarily focused on economic development and greater access to the regions natural resources. China is successfully portraying itself as a viable alternative model for economic development, one based on an authoritarian form of government and elite rule and without the restrictions and demands and that come with political liberalization. 20 This appears to be Beijing"s official story and it"s sticking to it.
China"s Military Engagement in Latin America -A Low Key, but Important Initiative
In examining the third element of the DIME paradigm -Military Might -one can see this is an area where Beijing has maintained a very low profile in Latin America.
Because of that low profile, most observers give marginal attention to the military and defense dimensions of Sino-Latin American relations instead focusing on the diplomatic and economic ties between China and the region. That said, it would be a mistake to underestimate China"s use of this element of national power as an effective tool to exert its influence in the region. While many critics point to China"s limited arms sales to Latin
America as the litmus test of China"s insignificant military status in the region, weapons trade is not the only measure of China"s military influence in the region. 21 There are a substantial number of engagement tools that the Chinese are using to shape the security environment in Latin America. These include military and defense education opportunities, official visits by military officers and defense officials at all levels, participation in combined exercises, unit exchanges, United Nations missions and air shows just to name a few. While it is difficult to obtain information on Chinese arms sales to Latin America, information points to that fact that China"s arms sales to the region have risen over the last couple of years. According to the People"s Liberation Army National Defense University graduate writing in Military Review, Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay are all rumored to have purchased aircraft from China. Beijing"s ability to sell small quantities of weapons systems is demonstrating its growing capacity in the region. Germany, Russia, France, Spain, and Brazil, one must consider how rapidly they have grown. 32 China"s use of military diplomacy as part of its grand strategy in the region is allowing it to posture itself for increased influence in many Latin American countries.
Beijing is exercising a sophisticated system of engagement mechanisms that are enhancing military-to military relations. China"s military is cautiously active in Latin America, building formative relationships one friend at a time. It is steadily making progress in securing relationships and it is doing so very rapidly. China"s military and security relations with Latin America are complex, multidimensional and highly developed. 33 The increase in military ties between China and Latin America appears to have a direct correlation to individual countries desires to diversify their security relationships away from a U.S.-centric orientation. 34 A failure of the United States to mitigate this trend in the near term is likely to manifest itself into a far greater problem in the future.
In Sino-Latin American Relations -Economics is King
The final element of the DIME paradigm -Economics -is without a doubt the China is now Latin America"s third largest trading partner behind the United States and the European Union. 37 China"s combined trade surpluses and high internal savings rate
give Beijing significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be invested in their countries. 38 China also maintains a distinct competitive advantage in leveraging its economic element of power. Many governments that receive aid from the PRC are attracted to the fact that the money comes with little or no caveats stipulating demanding human rights conditions or other good governance requirements levied by countries like the United States and other western nations. 39 Chinese direct foreign investment in Latin America still lags far behind that of the European Union and the United States with the E.U. being the region"s largest investor of $620 billion and the United States trailing with investments in the region totaling $350 billion. China"s direct foreign investment by contrast is estimated at $22 billion. 40 China"s direct foreign investments seek high levels of return regardless of social, labor, or environmental conditions and these issues tend to cause conflict with native populations in the region. 41 Another key component of Sino-Latin American economic relations centers around the fact that sustained Chinese economic growth within this past quarter century has required China to substantially increase its search for quantities of basic energy commodities such as petroleum products, coal, iron steel, and strategic minerals.
China"s ferocious appetite for new sources of energy supplies outside of Asia has led it to the doorstep of Latin America. Over the last decade, China"s economy has grown by nearly 10 percent annually. 42 There is no question that China has fueled a boom in the natural resources sector in Latin America. However, some Latin American economists worry about falling into a "commodity trap" in which resources are exported overseas and cheap imports flood the markets. While experiencing a boom in commodities, some manufacturing sectors are being eroded by inexpensive Chinese imports. To the contrary, some experts argue that the imports are actually good for Latin America in the sense that consumers ultimately benefit as these products are more affordable. 43 Some estimates show that China has the potential to become the world"s largest economy in 2032 and grow to be 20 percent larger than the United States by 2050. 44 Such estimates, even if over inflated, give credence to China"s future economic power. States as a country that uses its economic leverage to exert political pressure as a strategy of "containment"; this is another reason that China seeks to diversify its economic and security relationships. Latin America, in addition to being an important source of supply for energy commodities, is a huge strategic market for Chinese exports. Latin America, with a population of more than 500 million and economy of $3 trillion, is a very attractive market for China. At a time when the United States is concentrating its attention and resources on the war on violent extremism, China has made important inroads in expanding its economic influence throughout Latin America.
The PRC is actively courting nations in the region to build stronger economic and security relations. There is little doubt that the People"s Republic of China has moved from the periphery to become an important actor in hemispheric economic affairs. This new global strategy of China is considered by many security observers to be part of a grand offensive by Beijing to challenge U.S. interest and hegemony in the region.
Some experts take a benign viewpoint of China"s expanding global economic influence and categorize it as more of an opportunity than a threat. Many consider it a natural manifestation of China"s growing need for raw commodities and increased demand for new energy resources. 45 Undeniably, China has become much more sophisticated and influential in building economic partnerships in the region. It is now securing its access to critical resources from the region that it requires for continued economic growth and ensuring its trajectory as a rising global power.
Examining the DIME Paradigm in the Context of the Chinese Perception of Time
When one considers the significance of how China"s employment of the DIME to pursue its interests in Latin America is being measured, it is important to take into account the variable of time as a critical component of China"s strategy. The relationship of time to culture is profound and it is part of the enculturation process that shapes the human way of life from our very inception into this world. 46 Each culture has its own particular norms regarding the importance of time. Anthropologist Edward T. Hall proposed that cultures organize time in one of two manners: either monochronic (MTime) or polychronic (P-Time). These classifications represent two distinct approaches to perceiving and utilizing time. 47 Western cultures such as the United States view time as monochronic. Time is seen as a linear one directional continuous movement. It is often viewed as a commodity that can be bought, sold, saved, wasted, lost or borrowed.
Once it is passed, it cannot be brought back. Therefore, westerners use time very exactly, to the minute, in a second and so on. 48 Americans see time as tangible, thus promoting a need for schedules, deadlines and efficiencies on tasks that they undertake. In this context, time is finite, with a distinct beginning and end, and is often considered a constraint.
Chinese culture, on the other hand, perceives time as circular as opposed to linear and feels that all things in the world return to their original state after a cycle of time. This line of thinking puts more opulence to the concept of time allowing the Chinese to be more vague and relaxed with relation to time. They handle time at their disposal and do things at ease. 49 Polychronic cultures view the maintenance of harmonious relationships as prime. 50 The Chinese think that all things develop with the cycling of time; thus their need to create "ripe" conditions is the most important factor and the perceptions of their surroundings tend to dictate their actions. 51 Distinction of these two concepts of time is important because it demonstrates how the Chinese use of DIME will be employed radically different from a western approach. The Chinese perception of time enables them to approach their engagement with Latin America much differently. Should the conditions not be "ripe" for a particular element of DIME to be engaged in pursuit of their national interests, the Chinese leadership is unlikely to become frustrated. They will just wait until the cycle presents more accommodating circumstances for that particular DIME engagement. By contrast, western cultures, such as the United States, are likely to view the inability to employ a particular element of national power at a particular moment in time as an obstacle.
United States strategic leaders may see an opportunity as lost or wasted and are culturally programmed to become more frustrated. Consequently, they are more inclined to seek an alternative option in the interest of time. China, however, is more culturally aligned to bide its time until it can try again, staying focused on its long term strategies in the region. In some ways, this polychronic view of time provides a strategic advantage for the Chinese as they seek to expand their global influence. Time for China"s policy makers is a strategic enabler and a key component to achieve its geostrategic aims. To date, the challenges surrounding the multifaceted confrontations with China have been addressed through a policy of "engagement" directed by the past seven United States presidents in their relations with China. In its most simplistic form, it has been a policy that has sought to draw the United States and China closer through dialogue and avoid a strategic miscalculation. 54 The archaic idea that China can be "contained" is no longer viable or desirable given the dramatic effects of globalization. First and foremost, the United States policy makers need to "re-frame" the problem. This issue is not that China is levering its power to "move into" the region; the issue is that the United States has neglected its partnerships and has "moved out."
Second, the United States has to define its overarching bilateral relationship with China.
A failure to do this will only increase points of future friction as China"s rise continues.
Ultimately, this is the cornerstone that is missing. Until Washington develops an comprehensive national strategy to deal with the complexities of Sino-U.S. relations, the United States will likely continue to struggle with its relationship with China in the multilateral context in a region as complex as Latin America.
China"s interests in Latin America are significant and are unlikely to change in the near future. If the United States wants to alter the course of its relations in the region, it needs to embrace the realities there. In order to re-establish stronger ties with its partners in the region, the United States should seize the opportunities that exist to work with China and, in particular, the Latin American nations, in areas of mutual concern.
These areas of cooperative possibilities include venues of international trade, sustainable development, alternative energy research, and environmental sustainment in the region. Any other course that leads to a direct confrontation with China in the Americas will be counterproductive to other United States strategic interests elsewhere around the globe. Ultimately, this will mean potentially difficult compromises and choices for American policy makers. 55 Additionally, United States policy makers must pay more attention to what"s occurring in the hemisphere so that they can adjust more responsively. The increasing trend of American unpopularity in Latin America is substantial. Even without China"s increasing involvement in the region, America"s declining popularity decreases
Washington"s ability to use its soft power and potentially makes the United States resort to less desirable options, rather than persuasion, to meets its strategic objectives. 56 The
United States needs to re-calibrate its partnerships with its friends in the region and make a credible effort to reach out with a sincere and pragmatic public diplomacy campaign. It must leverage the strengths of its own elements of the DIME paradigm to not only the United State"s traditionally strong partners in the region, but also to those countries who demonstrate considerable anti-U.S sentiment. The United States and Latin America are historically linked politically, economically and, to an ever growing extent, culturally. While China"s presence in the hemisphere is growing, it is far from omnipresent. The United States has to re-focus its efforts to demonstrate to its southern neighbors that while China does have much to offer the region, the United
States can offer more and is still clearly the partner of choice. China"s rise in Latin
America should be a strategic warning for the United States. The choice must be to meet the challenge with the creativeness and ingenuity that has made America stand out as a global leader. Rather than speculate on how to mitigate the challenges regarding China, America should recognize them, embrace them, and let them serve as a catalyst to drive its foreign policy in Latin America in a more constructive manner. It is time for the United State to restore its partnerships in the region to a level that China will be unable to compete against.
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